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Abstract. Artificial neural networks tend to learn only what they need
for a task. A manipulation of the training data can counter this phe-
nomenon. In this paper, we study the effect of different alterations of
the training data, which limit the amount and position of information
that is available for the decision making. We analyze the accuracy and
robustness against semantic and black box attacks on the networks that
were trained on different training data modifications for the particular
example of morphing attacks. A morphing attack is an attack on a bio-
metric facial recognition system where the system is fooled to match two
different individuals with the same synthetic face image. Such a syn-
thetic image can be created by aligning and blending images of the two
individuals that should be matched with this image.
Keywords: Face image forgery detection, attacks on convolutional neu-
ral networks, convolutional neural network analysis.
1 Introduction
Biometric verification systems are nowadays present in many fields of daily life.
They are used in the consumer market, e.g. to unlock a mobile phone, as well
as for sovereign tasks like automatic border control. One huge advantage and
a reason for their success is that every individual carries his or her biometric
characteristics always with them and that they are difficult to copy by another
individual. Recently, the vulnerability of facial recognition systems against a
specific attacking method was made known [1]. This attack, which is called
morphing attack, tricks a facial recognition system into matching two different
individuals with one forged facial image. The detection of this kind of fraud is
substantial to ensure the trustworthiness, especially for security-related tasks
like entrance control.
Recently, several attacks on the prediction of neural networks with only small
perturbations of the content and without knowledge of the weights or architec-
ture of the network were published. This represents a danger for neural networks
in many applications, especially for security related applications where the net-
work should be accurate and robust against specific attacks on their decision
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making process. By the example of morphing attack detection, we present in
this paper different ways to evaluate the properties of neural networks, e.g. ro-
bustness against attacks, and the effect of different modification of the training
data on these properties. We train VGG19 [2] networks to detect morphing at-
tacks and differ the amount and location of information that can be used by the
network to detect the forgeries. The differently trained networks are analyzed
regarding their accuracy and two different kinds of attacks on the decision mak-
ing. One attack scenario represents a semantic attack where the forger leaves
only a few traces in the image so that the network needs to be able to recognize
every kind of artifacts to detect a morph. In the other scenario, we assume that
the attacker has access to the system as a black box and can test the system as
often as he likes. In order to get insights on the decision making of the different
networks and to understand the effects of the training data alteration, we use
layer-wise relevance propagation [3].
In the next section, we give a summary of the recent studies on face morphing
attacks and attacks on neural networks. Our fully automatic morphing pipeline
is presented in section 3, followed by details about our self-made and collected
face and morphing attack database in section 4. The setup of our experiments
and thus the generation of our specifically altered training data is described in
section 5. The analysis methods and results are presented in sections 6 and 7.
2 Related Work
The vulnerability of facial recognition systems was first published by Ferrara
et al. [1]. They created morphing attacks by manually aligning facial images of
different individuals and showed that they can trick commercial facial recognition
systems to verify both individual with the forged face image.
Several approaches for morphing attack detection were developed based on
different techniques. Raghavendra et al. [4] extracted facial micro-textures using
Binarized Statistical Image Features to distinguish between morphing attacks
and genuine images. The morphing detection method of Makrushin et al. [5] is
based on JPEG double compression. Neubert studies in [6] image degeneration to
detect morphing attacks. Morphing detectors based on CNNs were successfully
used by Seibold et al. [7] and Raghavendra et al. [8]. Ferrara et al. [9] went even
further and proposed a demorphing method, which is capable of extracting one
genuine face of a morphing attack, if an image the other face is known.
The vulnerability of neural networks against small perturbations in the im-
age was revealed by Szegedy et al. [10]. They also showed that the required
perturbations are not of random nature and depend on the dataset. To get these
perturbation they used a gradient-based method and backpropagation. Goodfel-
low et al. [11] proposed the fast gradient sign attack that requires only the sign of
the gradients of the required perturbation to perform the attack. Papernot et al.
[12] published a method to estimate the signs of these gradients without having
access to the weights or architecture by training a substitute model that behaves
similar to the network that should be fooled. To do so, they needed only access
to the final output of the network for generated images. Thus, they provided
a framework to use the fast gradient sign attack as a black box attack. Other
black box attacks that also try to model the network’s behavior by questioning
the network were published by Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan [13] and Dang
et al. [14]. Su et al. [15] showed that even a larger modification of only one pixel
is sufficient to change the prediction of the network.
3 Forged Facial Image Generation
3.1 Overview
Since we need a lot of morphing attacks to train our networks, we implemented
a fully automatic morphing pipeline similar to the face morphing pipelines in-
troduced in [5,7]. The idea of all of these pipelines is to create a facial image
that contains characteristics of two different individuals. They all start with an
alignment of two facial images and use additive alpha blending to generate the
forgery. Their differences are mostly in the processing of regions that are not
part of the inner face. Figure 1 provides an overview about our face morphing
pipeline. Our alignment and blending is presented in the following.
Input Image2
Input Image1
Landmarks Position
Estimation
Alignment
Simple Image 
Blending
Image Fusion
Fig. 1. Morphing Pipeline.
3.2 Image Alignment
We align the facial images based on predefined facial landmarks whose positions
we estimate using dLib’s [16] implementation of the facial feature detector de-
scribed in [17]. The images are warped such that the facial landmarks of both
images are at the same position and the regions between landmarks are trans-
formed similar to the nearest facial landmarks. The target position of a landmark
is its average position of both input images.
In the following, we describe two different warping methods, whereby we re-
fer to the original image as source image and to its warped version as target
image and accordingly to the landmark positions as source positions and tar-
get positions. Both approaches use different numbers of facial landmarks. We
add some additional landmarks for the triangle warp, whereas the field warping
approach only uses a small subset of the estimated landmarks. We used two dif-
ferent kinds of warping methods to increase the variety in data generation and
reduce a possible impact of the warping algorithm on our experiments.
Fig. 2. Basis of our image warping methods: landmarks estimated by dlib in red and
additional added landmarks in green (left), triangle mesh for triangle warp (center),
lines for field morphing (right).
Triangle Warp We add and fuse some landmarks to get a triangle mesh that
includes the whole image and to avoid degenerated triangles. The additional
landmarks are at the borders of the images, in the center of each eye, on the
cheeks, between mouth and chin and on the forehead, as shown in figure 2. The
points on the upper and lower line in the center of the lips, which were estimated
by dLib, are fused, since they are very close. After adding and removing the
feature points, we apply the Delaunay triangulation on the target point set to
obtain a mesh topology. This topology is then applied on the source point set.
Now, having a triangle mesh with the same topology on each image, we warp
the region of each triangle in the source image to the region of the triangle in
the target image using an affine transformation.
Beier-Neely field morphing The Beier-Neely field morphing algorithm [18] re-
quires corresponding line segments between the images to define a transforma-
tion. Since we only estimate a set of points, we connect some of them with a fixed
predefined pattern, as shown in figure 2, to be able to apply the field morphing
algorithm. The concept of this morphing method is to transform each pixel rela-
tive to the transformation of each line segment. The closer a line segment is to a
pixel, the stronger is its impact on the pixel’s transformation. The pixel position
of a target pixel in the source image is calculated by applying the transforma-
tion for each line pair individually, adding the weighted displacement vector and
normalizing it by the sum of weights. For one line segment Q in the target image
with end points Qs, Qe with Qn being the normal of the line segment, a pixel p
can be parametrized with two parameters u, v by
p = u‖Qe −Qs‖+Qs +Qnv. (1)
The pixel position p′ in the source image can now be calculated by
p′ = u‖Q′e −Q′s‖+Q′s +Q′nv, (2)
with Q′e, Q
′
s, Q
′
n being the end points and normal of the corresponding line seg-
ment in the source image. The impact or weight of a line on a pixel is defined
with respect to their distance in the target image by
w(p, Q) =
(
1
d+ ε
)2
, (3)
with d being the shortest distance from the pixel p to the line Q.
3.3 Image Blending
Since most of our facial landmarks are located in the face and not around the
head, ears or hair, the alignment procedure takes only the inner part of the face
below the forehead into account. A simple blending of the whole image would
thus lead to strong visible ghosting artifacts around the silhouette, hairstyle,
ears and, if included, shoulders. To avoid this striking forgery indicators, we
used the blending method proposed by Seibold et al.[7]. We blend only the
inner part of the face and use one aligned input image for the outer part. As a
consequence, we have to calculate a smooth and inconspicuous transition from
the blended image to the warped original one. The area of this transition is
defined as region between two ellipses with the same center. Their width and
height are determined relative to the estimated facial landmark positions. As the
authors of [7] do, we also separate the images in a high spatial frequency and a
low spatial frequency image and calculate for both of them a different transition
between the inner and the outer part. In this way, we can avoid cuts through
high frequency differences in the images and low frequency differences caused
by slightly different skin colors or different illuminations can be handled by a
smooth and small color gradient over this zone. The transition for the low spatial
frequency part is calculated using Poisson Image Editing [19]. The gradients for
the Poission equation in the transition zone are taken from the blended image.
For the high spatial frequency part of the images, we calculate a cut through the
transition area that does not create high frequencies around the cut. For that,
we use the graph cut algorithm with the penalty term used in [7] that prefer
cuts through regions with similar gradients. As the authors of [7], we apply this
algorithm on images in polar coordinates, so that shorter parts around the inner
border do not have lower cost due to less cuts.
4 Training Dataset
4.1 Database
To get a representative database, we acquired several freely-available face databases
and captured face images by ourselves. All of these images were manually checked
whether they are suitable for passports and images were removed in which the
person looked not directly into the camera, had the eyes closed, the mouth
opened or other requirements for passports were strongly violated. We gathered
about 1,900 images of different individuals. Table 1 provides an overview about
the image sources and number of used images per database.
We divide our set of original images into a training set that contains 80% of
Table 1. Face image sources.
Database BU-4DFE[20] CFD[21] FEI[22] FERET[23] PUT[24]
#used images 101 597 100 459 100
Database scFace[25] Utrecht[26] own various
#used images 108 64 261 89
all original images, a testing set (15%) and a validation set (5%). This distribu-
tion into training, testing and validation sets hold approximately also for each
individual database. Since there is obviously a strong dependency in the data
between original images and morphs, we used for the generation of morphing
attacks for the training, testing or validation set only images from the same set.
To ensure a good quality and variety of the morphs, we made some guidelines
for the selection of pairs of original images for morphing attacks:
1. both individuals have the same gender
2. 50% of the morphs use the triangle approach and 50% the field morphing
3. both images are from the same data base
4. each image is approximately used equally frequent to create a morph
4.2 Preprocessing
The generation of a morph requires a lot of image manipulations that change
characteristics like gradient distribution, correlation between neighbored pixels
and so on. This creates a lot of low-level artifacts that might be used by the
network to discriminate a morph from an original image [7]. Since this charac-
teristics depend strongly on the input data, we apply some kinds of noise and
blur to change this distributions in the original and forged face images to pre-
vent the network from discriminating on these characteristics and to focus on
more semantic high-level models. For each original image and for each morphing
attack in a set, we added two different kinds of noise and applied two different
kinds of blurring filters. Thereby, each image is added in five different versions to
Table 2. Parameters for data preprocessing.
Kind of Preprocessing Parameter Range
motion blur length between 0.5% and 1.0% of image height, random angle
Gaussian blur sigma between 0.25% and 0.5% of image height
Salt-and-pepper noise 1% of all pixels
Gaussian noise standard deviation of 0.05 (pixel intensities in [0,1])
one set: one version without any processing and one each after applying motion
blur, Gaussian blur, Salt-and-pepper noise or Gaussian noise. The parameters
for the different kinds of blur and noise vary for each image as shown in table 2.
To remove unnecessary variance in the input data and have a standardized input
for the network, we rotate, rescale and crop the images before feeding them into
the network. Each image is rotated such that the eyes are at the same height
and finally scaled and cropped to a size of 224 × 224 such that it contains the
region between eye brows and mouth and between the outer pars of the eyes.
During the training, this region is shifted slightly to augment the training data.
5 Experiment Settings
We start our training in all cases with a VGG19 network [2] that was pretrained
on the ILSVRC challenge. Although a naive training with genuine images and
morphing attacks leads to a quite good accuracy, its robustness against specific
attacks is rather poor, as shown in the following sections. In order to train a
network that is accurate and robust, we use different alterations of our training
data. Our key idea is to change the amount, location and kind of information that
is available to detect a morph. In this way we force the network to consider all
regions of the face during the training. For this purpose, we use partial morphs.
A partial morph is a forged facial image in which some regions are taken from
a morphed image and the rest from an aligned input image. We defined four
different regions in the face for the generation of our partial morphs. These
regions are the region around the right or left eye containing the eyebrows,
around the nose and around the mouth, see also figure 3. For each morphing
attack, the regions were automatically estimated relative to the facial feature
points estimated by dLib.
In the following, we present the four different kinds of training data manipu-
lation that were used in our experiments. In three cases, we perform a two class
classifier training. If an image has at least one forged region, the whole image is
assigned to the class morphing attack. In the fourth case, we first do a multiclass
training with four different classes. Each class represents one region and if this
region is forged, the image belongs to this class. To get a binary decision, we
remove the last fully connected layer and train the last layer and with a smaller
learning rate the second last layer for the binary class problem using the complex
morphs training method described below.
The relative amount of morphs and genuine image is designed such that each
Fig. 3. Regions for partial morphs.
class occurrences with equal frequency. The distribution of the different types of
morphs and the amount of genuine images for the different training methods is
as follows:
Naive training: 50% genuine images, 50% complete morphs
One region: 50% genuine images, 10% complete morphs and 4 × 10% with one
region morphed
Complex morphs: 50% genuine images, 10% complete morphs, partial morphs
with 10% one, two, three and four region morphed (each region is morphed with
equal frequency)
Multiclass (Complex morphs): partial morphs with zero, one, two, three or four
morphed regions (each 20% and each region is morphed with equal frequency); A
two class classifier is obtained by reinitializing the last fully connected layer and
training it with the same data as used in the complex morphs training method.
As mentioned above, the aim of our training data modification is to force the
network to take all available information for its decision making into account.
In case of a naive training it might be sufficient to focus on the eyes to detect
morphing attacks, but there are still other relevant information available that
were ignored by the network. In case of partial morphs the network has to gather
information from all region in the face to make a correct class prediction. One
disadvantage of the one region morphed training method is that less artifacts are
presented to the network during the training, if we keep the amount of genuine
images and forgeries identical. The complex morphs training method overcomes
this disadvantage partly, but again the network does not have to gather all avail-
able information in one morph to classify it correctly. The multiclass complex
morphs training method allows to present more artifacts and keeps the number
of images that are in one class identical to the images that are not in this class.
This way, we can present more morphing artifacts to the network without cre-
ating a class bias and can still force the network to use all available information
about morphing artifacts in one image.
6 Analysis Methods
We analyze the differently trained networks based on the accuracy and different
measurement for robustness. Especially a network for forgery detection should
be robust against all kind of attacks on its decision. Thus, we study two different
problem specific attacks, in which the attacker knows nothing about the forgery
detection system but tries to manipulate the images as little as possible and
as good as possible to leave no suspicious traces, and general attacks on neural
networks, where the attacker has access to the system as a black box.
Under the assumptions, that a professional tries to avoid artifacts and leaves
only some of them, the detection of partial morphs seem to be a good criteria
for robustness.
In another attack scenario, the attacker has access to the system and can test
the forged images as often as possible. Thus, he can attack the decision of the
network directly by creating adversarial examples that differ only slightly to
the created morphing attack but are classified as genuine image by the neural
network.
We modeled this attack using the fast gradient sign method [11] and generated
the adversarial examples using a substitute model [12]. This model is trained on
our validation data set and on adversarial examples that were generated as in
[12]. Since we had no success in fooling our networks using the shallow networks
in [12], we use a pretrained GoogLeNet [27] instead.
Beside our accuracy and robustness analysis, we try to get some insights on the
networks decision making and whether or how they differ [28]. For thus purpose,
we use the LRP-Toolbox [29] to mark regions in the image that were relevant
for the network’s decision. Over-simplified described, a region is relevant, if at
least one path from a neuron in the last layer that defines the class affiliation
to this region exists, and the neurons along this path have a strong activation
and large weights. We apply the LRP-toolbox on partial morphs to check if the
relevance is mostly in the morphed region and thus the classification was done
by detecting morphing artifacts. We use the epsilon decomposition as relevance
propagation method for the fully connected layers. The relevance of the later
convolutional layers was propagated using the α − β − decomposition with an
α of 2 and β of −1 and the relevance of the first convolutional layers using flat
weight decomposition. We consider only forgeries that were classified as such or
with an output at the softmax for the class ”morphing attack” was of least 0.1
so that there is relevance to propagate to the image.
7 Results
In the following, we present the accuracy and robustness that is achieved with
the different kinds of training methods and discuss the insight we got using rel-
evance propagation.
Accuracy We refer to the relative amount of correctly classified genuine images
as true positive rate and to the relative amount of correctly classified morphing
attacks as true negative. The best true positive rate was achieved using the
naive training method. This might be due to the fact that genuine images and
morphing attacks share the same content for partial morphs which were used
in the other training methods. All networks were better in classifying morphing
attacks than genuine images. By moving the threshold for the classifier, we could
counter this bias and got for the naive and the multiclass complex training
method the best equal error rates, whereas the EERs for the other two training
methods were at least twice that much.
Table 3. Accuracy of different training methods.
naive one morphed complex morphs multiclass
true positive 95% 90% 93% 92%
true negative 98% 95% 95% 99%
EER 3.1% 7.2% 6.1% 2.8%
Semantic Attacks Table 4 shows the true negative rates of our differently
trained networks for different kinds of partial morphs, where the attacker blends
only the region around right or left eye, the nose or the mouth. Our naive
trained network performs quite poor for this scenario, whereas all other training
methods perform significantly better. The detection rate for the same network
but for different kinds of partial morphs differ significant for some networks. The
naive training method performs worse in relative terms for partial morphs of the
nose and mouth, whereas the other three methods perform only worse on the
mouth than on partial morphs of other regions.
Table 4. Robustness against partial morphs.
left eye right eye nose mouth average
naive 25% 21% 14% 13% 20%
one morphed 81% 89% 79% 71% 80%
complex morphs 78% 74% 73% 54% 70%
multiclass 86% 93% 90% 79% 87%
Black Box Attacks The other attack scenario we study is a black-box attack
using adversarial examples. As mentioned above, we use the fast gradient sign
method and a GoogLeNet for the substitute model to generate adversarial ex-
amples instead of the shallow architectures as in the original paper. Since an
attacker would of course try to modify a morphing attack to let it be classified
as an genuine image and not the other way around, we focus only on the classi-
fication results for morphing attacks. Figure 5 shows the robustness against this
kind of attack. All networks were vulnerable against this attack with a strong
modification in the image, but especially for small and for the human eye not vis-
ible changes their vulnerability differ quite strong. The network that was trained
using the naive method is the most vulnerable, the 2-classes training methods
with partial morphs are more robust, but still perform worse than the multi-
class training method. Even with a change of the intensities by ±6, which leads
to a visible noise-like pattern (see figure 4), still about 91% of the adversarial
examples are correctly classified.
Fig. 4. Adversarial examples created for the naive trained network. The left image is in
both cases the original image and the right image the adversarial attack with a change
of the intensities of 6. The attack on the right was successfull, whereas the adversarial
attack on the left was still classified as fraud.
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Fig. 5. Robustness against fast gradient sign attacks.
Relevance Distribution Whereas the overall accuracy of our networks differs
only less than 5 percent, we got quite different results for the robustness against
partial morphs. The robustness also differs strongly for different kinds of partial
morphs for the same network. Using relevance propagation, we try to get some
insights about this behavior. We applied the relevance propagation on partial
morphs and only if the softmax output of the network for the class morphing
attack was at least 0.1, since if there is no or only little relevance in the neuron
for the class ”morphing attack”, there will be no or only noisy relevance for this
class in the image. Some neurons in the network are always active and thus lead
to relevance that is always present. To overcome this problem, we subtracted the
average relevance for each pixel. Finally, we removed all negative relevance, since
negative relevance can be interpreted as inhibiting the decision for this class.
The relevance for the three networks that were trained directly on the binary
decision is mostly in the morphed region as one would expect (see table 5 and
figure 6). For these three networks, a strong correlation between the location of
the relevance and the detection of the partial morphs can be found. For instance,
the naive trained network performs worse on partial morphs of the nose and
mount and the relevance for partial morphs of the nose or mouth are to a large
extend outside of the morphed region. The same behavior can be observed for
the training method with complex morphs and partial morphs of the mouth.
Table 5. Relevance distributions.
relative amount of relevance per region
morphed naive one morphed
region left eye right eye nose mouth left eye right eye nose mouth
left eye 0.84 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.04
right eye 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.92 0.01 0.07
nose 0.21 0.28 0.47 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.02
mouth 0.34 0.27 0.04 0.35 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.68
complex morphs multiclass
left eye right eye nose mouth left eye right eye nose mouth
left eye 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.01
right eye 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.08 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.00
nose 0.02 0.03 0.92 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.70
mouth 0.06 0.00 0.41 0.53 0.11 0.18 0.58 0.13
The relevance distribution indicates that the model for forged eyes of the
naive network is not as bad as it seems when looking at the robustness against
partial morphs. The bad robustness might be due to the fact that the naive
trained network was trained only on complete morphs and genuine images and
thus has no knowledge about how to classify an image that contains character-
istics of both classes. On the other hand, the relative bad robustness against
partial morphs of the nose and mouth and the bad distribution of relevance for
these morphs suggests that the naive trained network represents these parts only
weakly. This is not surprising, since the eyes might be sufficient to distinguish
between morphs and genuine images in most cases.
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Fig. 6. Average mean adjusted positive relevance distribution for the naive and one
morphed training method grouped by the different kinds of partial morphs.
Relevance Distribution Interpretation for Multiclass Training The rel-
evance distribution for the multiclass training methods seems at the first glance
completely misleading, but might point out to a network that compares different
structures. A structure in the neural network that explains this kind of relevance
distribution can, for instance, rely mainly on a model for genuine images and
be connected as follows. Assuming we have two neurons that have a strong ac-
tivation, if the eyes of the individual in the image looks like a male Caucasian
in his late twenties. One neuron represents the left eye and the other one the
right eye. If one of the eyes does not fit to the model, e.g., due to a morphing
artifact, it has a low activation. If we subtract the activation of one neuron from
the activation of the other one, we get either a large negative or positive acti-
vation. The large negative activation would be clamped by the rectified linear
unit, while the position activation would remain and indicate a morph. As a
result, we have a path of strong activation from this neuron, to the area in the
input image around the genuine eye and thus relevance in its region. Thus, the
absence of relevance in a region can also indicate the importance of this region.
For comparisons with feature maps that show a strong activation if a region is
morphed, we can still expect that the relevance for a genuine region is different
than if this region is forged.
Figure 7 shows the relevance distribution of different partial morphs of the
same pair of input images for the multiclass training method. In cases of one
morphed region (upper images), there is nearly no relevance in the morphed
region, but negative or positive relevance in the other parts of the image. If all
but one region was morphed (lower images), there is again nearly no relevance
in the forged parts, but a lot of relevance in the original part of the image. Some
relevance is also assigned to the left eye if this region is forged, but it is much
less than if this region is genuine.
left eye right eye
all but right eyeall but left eye
Fig. 7. Relevance distribution for the multiclass training of different kinds of partial
morphs based on one input image pair.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented different training methods based on modifications
of the training data for the example of face morphing attack detection. We an-
alyzed the resulting networks regarding accuracy, robustness and got insights
about differences in their decision making.
We showed that accuracy does not always comes along with robustness against
attacks on the network. Using partial morphs, in which only a part of the image
is forged, during training, we enhanced the network to detect morphs also if
only a part of the image was forged and we enhanced also the robustness against
adversarial attacks. Our analysis on the decision making process of the networks
indicates that the naive trained network focuses a lot on the region around the
eyes and gives less priority to the region around the nose and mouth which leads
to a weak distinctive model for these regions. The networks that were trained
with partial morphs tend to have better models for all regions of the face, but
have a worse accuracy. We overcome this problem by a complex multiclass pre-
training by which we got a robust and accurate network. Our analysis of the
decision making process of this network indicates that it compared different re-
gion among each other to detect morphing attacks, whereas this comparison
structure was not visible for the other training methods.
In future work we will combine the complex multiclass pretraining with defence
mechanisms against adversarial attacks [30] to further robustify the neural net-
work models.
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